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The  beginning  of  Antonio  Gamoneda’s  book-length  poem, 
“Descripción de la mentira” (1977) ‘Description of the Lie’ includes 
an  enigmatic  allusion  to  testimony:  “Huelo  los  testimonios  de 
cuanto es sucio sobre la tierra y no me reconcilio pero amo lo que 
ha quedado de nosotros” (El 176) ‘I smell the testimonies of all that 
is filthy on earth and I do not reconcile myself but I love what is 
left of us.’1 The statements contained within this line pose at least 
three questions: Who or what is “all that is filthy on earth”? What 
is “left of us”? With whom or with what is there no reconciliation? 
The  poem  does  not  provide  enough  context  to  answer  these 
questions. Upon a first reading of the text, it is impossible to identify 
or  characterize  the  name  of  that  which  is  deemed  “filthy,”  the 
remains to which the verb to leave alludes, and the circumstances 
surrounding the estrangement that the reference to reconciliation 
presupposes. Reserve envelops the line and multiplies the questions: 
To whom does the personal pronoun “us” refer? Who cannot be 
reconciled? Who gives these testimonies? Who receives them? The 
personal deictics thrown into relief by these queries hint at a series 
of silences or absences. Moreover, the fact that the line mentions 
“testimonies” increases the sense of textual reserve. After all, any 
reference to testimony fosters the expectation that some direct and 
true knowledge will be conveyed. Yet we do not know what these 
singular “testimonies” are based on, nor do we know their content, 
their bearer, and their recipient. The mere mention of them shows 
that the text remains silent not once but many times. As a result, 
the silence kept by the line becomes ever more resonant. Although Aguirre-Oteiza                               379
it interpellates us from the page, calling upon us through the use of 
the first person plural “us,” the line falls silent time and time again. 
It is, literally, a reticent line.
Gamoneda was born in Oviedo in 1931. Three years later he 
moved to León, a Spanish city that in 1936 would become “a privi-
leged location” for the repression of those faithful to the Republic at 
the hands of the insurgents (Gamoneda, “En Asturias” n. pag.). At 
the age of five, he witnessed the disappearance of prisoners in León’s 
convent of San Marcos, a prison he would later call a concentration 
camp (Lugar 15). Gamoneda published his first poems in 1949 and 
began Descripción de la mentira a few weeks after the death of the 
dictator Francisco Franco. The poem, composed between 1975 and 
1976 in Boñar and León, is inflected by testimony, history, and me-
mory: its writing constitutes not only Gamoneda’s “testimonio de 
un tiempo histórico” ‘testimony of a historic time’ that begins in 
July of 1936 and ends with the transition of Spain to democracy, but 
also illustrates how this transition stirs up the process of memory 
(Gamoneda “Entrevista” n. pag.).2 Therefore, the autobiographical 
account inscribed in Descripción de la mentira covers the first years 
of Francoist repression—the time of silence between 1936 and 1945 
that meant the continuation of war as a work of cultural destruction 
(Richards Time 3). Time of silence is a pertinent description here 
insofar as Descripción de la mentira “procede del silencio” (Gamo-
neda Lugar 78) ‘comes from silence.’ In 1975, Gamoneda had not 
published poetry for twelve years: “Durante quinientas semanas he 
estado ausente de mis designios, / …  silencioso hasta la maldición” 
(El 175) ‘For five hundred weeks I have been out of touch with my 
intentions, / … silent until damnation.’ Miguel Casado, the critic 
who has done the most to bring Gamoneda’s work out of silence, 
characterizes his poetry as a “strategy of reticence”: theoretically si-
gnificant facts are silenced so as to show what “en la realidad, fuera 
de condiciones culturales, es sustantivo” (58) ‘in reality, outside of 
any cultural condition, is substantial.’ Thus, testimony and the limits 
of representation that reticence presupposes are traits that define 
Gamoneda’s poetry.
In  a  study  of  Paul  Celan’s  poetry,  Geoffrey  Hartman  takes 
into account the possible ties between testimony and the limits of 
representation: “We cannot read Celan’s life from his work: how then 380       ST&TCL, Volume 36, No. 2 (Summer 2012)
is that work related to the Holocaust? Can so reticent an art with 
a style that marks an absence be a form of testimony?” (Hartman 
161).  These  questions  are  relevant  here  because  Gamoneda’s 
reticent poetry is also deeply shaped by historical and biographical 
circumstances. To what extent can we read his life in his poetry? 
How does Descripción de la mentira relate to Spain’s recent history 
and, in particular, to the time of silence under Francoist repression? 
Is it possible for poetry such as his, marked by silence and absence, to 
constitute a form of testimony?3 Hartman’s response to the reticence 
of  one  of  the  Holocaust’s  most  prominent  poets  illustrates  the 
context evoked by my re-reading of Gamoneda’s work in 2005. My 
reception of his poetry was inscribed in the horizon of expectations 
created  by  recent  critical  reappraisals  of  the  history,  testimony, 
and memory of the Holocaust, as well as the changing historical 
memory of the Spanish Civil War, Francoism, and Spain’s transition 
to democracy.4 Historian Tony Judt, showing concern for “the place 
of recent history in an age of forgetting” (Reappraisals 1), stated in 
2005 that Spain tacitly turned a blind eye to “the painful memory 
of the civil war” in the twenty years that followed its transition to 
democracy, and that only now, in the twenty-first century, has a 
public debate about the war and its results begun (Postwar 829-30).5 
Studies on memory and related concepts such as trauma, testimony, 
monument, specters, forgetting, and repression have proliferated in 
historiography about the period between the Spanish Civil War and 
the transition to democracy (Suleiman 5). For Michael Richards, 
cultural phenomena that historians of contemporary Spain should 
take  into  account  include  “violent  acts,  the  level  of  consequent 
trauma  and  the  inability  to  forget”  (“Limits”  n.  pag.).  Cultural 
studies about repression and the transition to democracy have also 
benefitted from recent approaches in memory studies (Ferrán 16). 
Following Judt’s lead, in 2006 historian Santos Juliá denounced the 
fact that Spain was living under the “empire of memory” because 
what had happened was less important than the memory of it, and 
facts had yielded to their representations, which acquired a kind of 
“existencia autónoma, independiente de los hechos representados” 
(“Bajo el imperio” 7) ‘autonomous existence, independent from the 
represented facts.’ In 2006, Juliá sharply differentiated between the 
discourses of history and memory: while history aims to “conocer, Aguirre-Oteiza                               381
comprender,  interpretar  o  explicar  y  actúa  bajo  la  exigencia  de 
totalidad y objetividad” ‘know, understand, interpret or explain, 
and acts under the demand of totality and objectivity,’ memory 
tries to “legitimar, rehabilitar, honrar o condenar y actúa siempre 
de manera selectiva y subjetiva” (“Presentación” 17) ‘to legitimize, 
rehabilitate, honor or condemn, and always acts in a selective and 
subjective manner.’ The debate over the historical memory of the 
Spanish Civil War and the Francoist period gathered momentum at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. The passing of the Law of 
Historical Memory by the Spanish Congress in 2007 is important in 
this context. Since 2000, the emergence of groups of civil activists 
has brought about an “explosion in Republican memory” (Graham 
141).  Prominent  among  these  groups  is  the  Association  for  the 
Recovery of Historical Memory, which was founded in 2003 as a 
consequence of the opening of a common grave near León two 
months earlier. Shortly after, in 2004, the Pozo Grajero Association 
unveiled a plaque to commemorate fifteen firing squad deaths that 
took place in the Boñar cemetery. 
León and Boñar are the only toponyms that appear in Descrip-
ción de la mentira. These, and the years 1975 and 1976, are the only 
historical or geographical markers that, in the paratextual threshold 
in which they are embedded, allow us to remember or imagine a 
specific context for the poem. Aside from the author’s name, León 
and Boñar are the only proper names that may help us interpret the 
enigmatic and ghostly deictic expressions that mark the text as a 
whole and characterize references to testimony in particular. The 
links between text, paratext, and context also formed my horizon of 
expectations when I reread Gamoneda’s poetry in 2005. Knowledge 
about the debate over historical memory stirred my curiosity about 
the reception of Descripción de la mentira, including readings tech-
nically  unrelated  to  the  historical  context—or,  as  Casado  states, 
“outside of any cultural conditions”—stemming from its publica-
tion in 1977 and subsequent dissemination at the end of the cen-
tury.6 Gamoneda’s poetry was gradually integrated into the debate 
over historical memory in Spain. In 2007, an excerpt from his book 
Gravestones appeared on a commemorative plaque installed in León 
in memory of those repressed by the Francoist regime.7 In addition, 
Gamoneda himself became a “place of memory”: the slow public 382       ST&TCL, Volume 36, No. 2 (Summer 2012)
recognition of his work culminated in 2006 when he was awarded 
the prestigious Cervantes Prize, in the midst of the controversy over 
the Law of Historical Memory. Some opponents of the law criticized 
the prize because, in their opinion, there existed links between a law 
that seemed to rekindle Civil War sentiment and the institutional 
activities and political affinities of the prizewinning poet. 
Both the popularity acquired by Gamoneda in this debate and 
his statements about the relationship of recent Spanish history to 
his writing can distract from the fact that Descripción de la mentira 
still seems reticent, even “incomprehensible.”8 The text concludes 
with a baffling assertion that, in the current context of historical 
memory, should serve as a warning: “Este relato incomprensible es 
lo que queda de nosotros” (El 222) ‘This incomprehensible account 
is what is left of us.’ “What is left of us” echoes the previously cited 
text about “testimonies” that appears at the beginning of the book. 
The poem, “this account,” is also “what is left of us” now, in the 
present of reading signaled by the deictic “this.” This concluding 
line answers the interpellation previously inscribed in the enigmatic 
reference to “testimonies” at the poem’s beginning: “what is left of 
us.” The “account” nears its end remembering its “incomprehensible” 
character. As a singular form of testimony, the poem only manages 
to witness the enigma that surrounds the “testimonies” alluded to 
in the beginning of the text, not the historical event itself. In this 
sense, the line “this incomprehensible account is what is left of us” is 
also a “reticent testimony,” and the poem does not contribute to the 
goals of either history or memory, according to Juliá’s definitions. 
The aim of this “incomprehensible account” is not to “interpret 
or explain,” as history does. Rather, the poem presents the kind of 
“autonomous existence” Juliá attributes to representations of the 
Civil War and Francoism. Indeed, Gamoneda’s account somehow 
fits  Juliá’s  definition  of  memory:  it  is  selective  and  subjective. 
Yet,  if  the  explanatory  and  communicative  elements  disappear 
from the text, the purpose of Descripción de la mentira cannot be 
that of memory, if its aim is to “legitimize, rehabilitate, honor o 
condemn” (“Una conversación” n. pag.). Reticence, defined as the 
withdrawing of “objective facts” from the text, is a major component 
of Gamoneda’s poetics. Although Descripción de la mentira may 
seem to refer to a “circunstancia colectiva o circunstancia histórica” Aguirre-Oteiza                               383
‘collective or historical circumstance,’ the informative aspect of the 
matter—the  denunciatory  memory  often  inscribed  in  politically 
engaged poetry—is not explicit in the poem (“Una conversación” n. 
pag.). Thus, Gamoneda’s “incomprehensible account” can hardly be 
called historical memory, if this term for our relationship to the past 
implies a search for reparation (Juliá “Presentación”).
For Gamoneda, memory is always the memory of loss, a me-
mory that is simultaneously a memory of death, and his poetry 
aims at representing memories of death, of suffering, and of horror 
(Gamoneda “Barjola”). If in Spain historical memory serves as “the 
moral  ground  for  political  demands  and  condemnations”  (Lou-
reiro “Pathetic” 226), and a perspective based on past grievances 
is contributing to the distortion of historiography, Descripción de 
la mentira differs from current dominant discourses about histo-
rical memory insofar as it constitutes a form of testimony that re-
sists being reduced to ideological statements of any sort. Archives 
do not offer an immediate reflection of the real, but rather, a form 
of writing mediated by syntax and ideology (Didi-Huberman 152). 
In this light, the form of testimony articulated through Gamoneda’s 
poem seems relevant, though not because history’s aim “to know, 
understand, interpret” has been discredited.9 Gamoneda’s singular 
testimony reminds us of the impossibility, “under the demand of 
totality and objectivity,” of giving a full or “true” account of pain 
and death in the past (Engdahl 10). If historiography can be argued 
to create a comprehensible “theatre of shadows” where the absent 
ones are the players, then Descripción de la mentira is an incompre-
hensible account because its aim is to attest to absences and silences 
as they really are (Ricoeur 365). The poem is a contradictory testi-
mony inasmuch as the disappeared inscribed in the text appear as 
disappeared, and the shadows haunting it resist elucidation. For Ga-
moneda, poetry’s function is to comply with and heighten this dis-
cursive practice. Only after writing Descripción de la mentira did he 
supply the facts that would help to explain the reference in the text 
to a “collective or historical circumstance” (“Una conversación” n. 
pag.). In a recent reminiscence about some intellectuals with whom 
he was associated during Francoism, Gamoneda stated: “Ya casi to-
dos somos únicamente sombras: los suicidas activos y pasivos; los 
muertos ensangrentados y los muertos de pena; los que están sin 384       ST&TCL, Volume 36, No. 2 (Summer 2012)
estar; los que no acaban de irse” (Cuerpo 104) ‘By now almost all 
of us are merely shadows: the active and passive suicide victims, 
the bloodied dead, and those saddened to death; those that are here 
without being here; and those that never fully go away.’ The poet has 
also described how these “shadows” responded to the transition to 
democracy in Spain: 
Lo que se ha extinguido no es más que la conciencia errónea y 
deseante de una verdad “que iba a venir.” Entonces, las palabras 
ya no son más que el canto de la desaparición, es decir, de “lo que 
queda de nosotros”: la perplejidad de contemplar nuestros actos 
(que pensábamos revolucionarios) “en el espejo de la muerte.”   
(Cuerpo 177, original emphasis) 
What has been extinguished is nothing more than the wishful but 
mistaken conscience of a truth that “was to come.” Thus, words 
are nothing more than the song of disappearance; that is, of “what 
is left of us”: the perplexity of contemplating our own acts (which 
we thought were revolutionary) “in the mirror of death.” 
“The song of disappearance” chanted by the “shadows” that have 
arrived at this eschatological contemplation from beyond the grave 
defines Descripción de la mentira. If memory is always consciousness 
of loss, and thus consciousness of going “hacia la muerte” ‘towards 
death,’ poetry is a unique art of memory inasmuch as the poet 
contemplates his acts “in the mirror of death” (Cuerpo 24). This art 
of memory consists of withdrawing the objective facts that do not 
bear witness to suffering, disappearance, and death. For any inter-
pretive approach to the memory of Gamoneda’s “shadows,” it seems 
appropriate to remember Primo Levi’s warning in The Drowned and 
the Saved: no one ever returns to describe his own death.10 The sur-
viving “shadow” capable of saying “now / the perfection of death is 
in my spirit,” explicitly poses the question of the memory of death: 
“Vi la muerte rodeada de árboles ... // ¿Qué harías tú si tu memoria 
estuviera llena de olvido …?” (El 206, 201) ‘I saw death encircled 
with trees.... // What would you do if your memory were full of 
forgetting….?’11 Like Celan and Levi, Gamoneda writes in spite of 
all. The question Descripción de la mentira poses is, to use Georges 
Didi-Huberman’s words: how does one give testimony from within Aguirre-Oteiza                               385
death?12 The answer to this question entails a contradiction: testi-
mony implies telling “in spite of all, that which is impossible to tell 
entirely” or, more precisely, “to create, in spite of all, the possibility 
of a testimony” (Didi-Huberman 104-05). Gamoneda’s poem offers 
at least the possibility of an ethical discourse in the face of the fri-
ghtening trap of history consisting of the impossibility of speech for 
the integral testimony of death; if, in these circumstances, criticism 
depends on “a dialectical approach capable of handling both speech 
and silence, both lack and remains, both the impossible and, in spi-
te of all, testimony and archive,” Gamoneda can be said to create, 
“in spite of all, the possibility of a testimony” from silence and lack 
(Images 104-05).13
Prosopopeia is the figure of speech that makes the invisible 
visible and gives a face to the disappeared or the inexistent. Ac-
cording to Paul de Man, prosopopeia is the fiction of a voice that 
comes from beyond the grave—“an apostrophe to an absent, de-
ceased or voiceless entity, which posits the possibility of the latter’s 
reply, and confers upon it the power of speech” (“Autobiography” 
75-76). Apostrophe makes evident the dialogical nature of proso-
popeia (Loureiro, “Autobiografía” 144). In Descripción de la mentira 
prosopopeia affords the possibility of conversing with death: “En 
los establos olorosos donde me envuelve la oscuridad yo recibo a 
la muerte y conversamos.…” (183) ‘In the scented stables where 
darkness wraps around me I receive death and we converse.…’ The 
intimate register of Gamoneda’s dialogue reveals the ethical ele-
ment characterizing prosopopeia as a response and responsibility 
towards the other. Testimony is thus inscribed in an exchange that 
establishes a dialogic situation. Far from being reduced to asserting 
“I was there,” testimony implies a speech act addressed to a person: 
“believe me” (Ricoeur 164). In Descripción de la mentira, this type of 
dialogue is marked by a silent testimony—a reticent testimony pre-
ceding the account given by the poet, the survivor-turned-shadow 
(Agamben 161). This dialogic situation is brought about by ghostly 
faces that, in turn, invoke an incredulous poet: “No creo en las invo-
caciones pero las invocaciones creen en mí” (El 173) ‘I don’t believe 
in invocations but invocations believe in me.’ Thus, the incredulous 
poet’s testimony consists, contradictorily, of lending voice to the si-
lent testimony given by dead or absent figures that believe in him. 386       ST&TCL, Volume 36, No. 2 (Summer 2012)
They command him to speak even as he lends voice, or creates the 
possibility of lending it, through a simile: “como si consistieran ... en 
la unidad de mis palabras” (174) ‘as if they consisted … of the unity 
of my words’. It is the suspicion or doubt expressed by the poet, his 
incredulity, and the discredit that surrounds the invocations, that, 
again contradictorily, make the accreditation of testimony possible 
(Ricoeur 164). The certification of the testimony “is not complete 
except through the echo response of the one who receives the tes-
timony and accepts it”: the incessant dialogue articulated by Ga-
moneda’s testimony as speech act also depends on this alternative 
between “confidence and suspicion” (164). Only when the “unity of 
my words” becomes “una amistad dentro de mí mismo” (El 174) ‘a 
friendship within myself’ is the poet able to “smell the testimonies”. 
This reciprocal relationship is necessary because testimony always 
involves the risk of fictions and lies—the possibility of literature 
and, specifically, of poetry (Derrida “Demeure” 27, 56). According 
to J. Hillis Miller, novels and poems are speech acts. What the nar-
rative voice states is accompanied by an implicit assertion: “I swear 
that this is what I saw, that it really happened.” In this sense, every 
literary work constitutes a form of testimony. Poetry entails a per-
formative speech act, a promise to which the reader responds with 
another speech act that seals a dialogic pact as a willing suspension 
of disbelief in the threshold between truths and lies. “I promise this 
is true: believe me”; “I promise to believe you” (38-39).14 Gamoneda’s 
poetry is testimonial because it is a speech act involving a reciprocal 
relationship between the poet and an absent or voiceless entity.
The apostrophe that establishes the dialogic situation articula-
ted by testimony is the constitutive speech act of most poetry. Poets 
create their textual presence deictically, through images of voice or 
invocations (Culler 140-41). Later in Descripción de la mentira, the 
poet proposes a sort of impossible dialogue when he addresses an 
anonymous, disappeared second person: “Tú invocabas al chamariz” 
(El 196) ‘You invoked the call-bird’. Prosopopeia consists here of an 
apostrophe that the surviving poet addresses to a suicide victim: the 
invocation is an evocation. The poet brings a now voiceless person 
into the present by preserving an echo or memory of an incessant 
invocation, the peculiar invocation that this unnamed person used 
to, in turn, address the “call-bird.” The name chamariz signals the Aguirre-Oteiza                               387
bird’s ability to imitate the song of other birds and attract them with 
its call. The fact that the name chamariz—originally Portuguese for 
call-bird—is regional underlines the singular, almost untranslatable 
experience of the witness. Thus, the intimate dialogue created by 
the poet articulates, in a simultaneous and contradictory, recurrent 
and reticent fashion, the testimony to a disappearance. The poem 
becomes the call or song of an incessant disappearance. As Giorgio 
Agamben argues, both poets and witnesses believe language is what 
remains after loss, what survives “the possibility, or impossibility, of 
speaking” (161). In Descripción de la mentira the practical impos-
sibility of speaking with the dead or the disappeared is inscribed in 
two pacts. The poet reminds the reader and himself that, while “la 
tortura ha pactado con las palabras” (El 175) ‘torture has made a pact 
with words,’ he has kept silent. In spite of this silence, the poet then 
asserts: “Voy a pactar con tu desaparición” (191) ‘I will make a pact 
with your disappearance.’ The “pact,” another speech act, coincides 
with the act of apostrophe, enacting a “song of disappearance”—
a song of shadows and anonymous faces, both present and future 
ones. This “song” fits de Man’s definition of prosopopeia. Moreover, 
if prosopopeia means giving a face to an anonymous entity because 
the original face is absent or inexistent, then the figure of speech 
that provides a face, and hence a voice, to this entity is catachresis 
(“Lyrical” 57). Gamoneda’s poetic thought resists reflexive thought 
inasmuch as it comes from “lo Desconocido” ‘the Unknown’ and 
“realiza lo irreal” ‘it realizes the unreal’ (“Discurso” n. pag.). Descri-
pción de la mentira is catachrestic because it attests to absences as 
they really are, giving a secondary or posthumous voice to anony-
mous entities that come from “the Unknown.” 
Catachresis implies a promise. To say that one gives voice to 
what is voiceless or sees what is invisible amounts to proposing a 
pact with the listener, a speech act: “believe me.” “I saw death” is per-
formative, enacting the impossibility of lending an image to what is 
imageless. It constitutes a singular act of testimonial speech. In line 
with Agamben’s reading of Levi’s testimony, witnesses capable of of-
fering a true or complete testimony of death do not come back to 
give an account of their experience, or they come back mute. Gamo-
neda’s witnesses, “the active and passive suicide victims, the bloo-
died dead, and those saddened to death, those that are here without 388       ST&TCL, Volume 36, No. 2 (Summer 2012)
being here; and those that never fully go away,” find themselves in a 
similar situation (Cuerpo 104). Only those who return, the ones that 
remain, the survivors, the pseudo-witnesses, can give an account 
of death consisting of the song of disappearance (Agamben 120). 
But their account is incomplete and somewhat incomprehensible: a 
catachresis. Gamoneda’s account is catachrestic because it contains 
the remains coming “from the silence” of “invocations.” Contradic-
torily, these remains move spectrally in the “espesor” ‘thickness’ of 
his ears—in a singular, anonymous “theatre of shadows” that are 
“there without being there,” that “never fully go away,” or that are 
only present here, in the poem.15
One response to the promise implied by catachresis is to show 
respect for the strangeness that surrounds any unique account. This 
strangeness is a feature both of testimonial accounts and of the 
poetry that Gamoneda alchemically writes, in spite of all, with “la 
lengua de los opresores” (Lugar 54-55) ‘the language of the oppres-
sors.’ The dialogic situation established through invocation in his 
poetry involves the reader and, therefore, the critic. The response 
and responsibility towards the other defining the ethical element in 
apostrophe also concerns the critic when he is interpellated throu-
gh the deictic “you” about “what is left of us,” the “incomprehen-
sible account” that is Descripción de la mentira : “¿Qué sabes tú de 
la mentira?” (El 188) ‘What do you know about the lie?’. Criticism 
should be mindful of this ethical element in its attempt to compre-
hend the singular testimony inscribed in Gamoneda’s poetry (Lou-
reiro “Autobiografía” 144). Miller warns that literary studies can 
hide the singularity and strangeness of literary discourse by “tur-
ning it into the familiar” (33). Familiarization would seem to be the 
aim of those studies on testimony in which reading allows for “the 
conscious integration of traumatic events.” In this model, the critic 
is seen as a mediator and the “act of memory” taking place between 
witness and reader is “potentially healing because it generates nar-
ratives that ‘make sense’”: “the traumatic event of the past needs to 
be made ‘narratable’” (Bal x, original emphasis). Gamoneda’s singu-
lar account does not lend itself openly to healing or reconciliatory 
readings.16 One could say, with Adorno, that “hardly anywhere else 
does suffering still find its own voice, a consolation that does not 
immediately betray it” (“Commitment” 88). The strangeness of Ga-Aguirre-Oteiza                               389
moneda’s account persists in spite of all: “all that is filthy on earth” 
still leaves an enigmatic trace for politically-oriented discourses that 
may attempt to make it familiar. 
In his critical essays, Gamoneda defends the value of enigma in 
the work of art, as opposed to the facts that are in the concept, the 
explicit and “objective facts” that would contribute to the creation 
of an informative “relato temático” ‘thematic account’: “el enigma es 
una suplencia eficacísima, una significación plenaria, infinitamente 
abierta, ante la que nos manifestamos intensamente receptivos y ac-
tivos” (Cuerpo 205-06) ‘enigma constitutes a most efficient substitu-
tion, a plenary signification, infinitely open, before which we show 
ourselves intensely receptive and active.’ The receptivity that this 
“infinitely open” signification fosters in the reader should be attu-
ned to the singularity of the witness’s account.17 As Renaud Dulong 
argues, the message of testimony tries to keep the past “as enigma, 
as scandal, as interpellation” (Engdahl 10). Thus, in the threshold 
between comprehension and incomprehension, testimony and li-
terature converge: “The witness talks of something that is incom-
prehensible in the hope that someone else will make it possible to 
understand and with the certainty that any explanation must be re-
jected as inadequate” (Engdahl 10). Poetry and testimony coincide 
in the fact that their singular character is the condition of their uni-
versality. The example par excellence of an experience that is irre-
ducibly singular and thus all the more universal is the experience of 
death, as Celan’s poetry illustrates (Bonnefoy 209). One of the truths 
that Gamoneda’s contradictory poetic testimony remembers is the 
enigma that history hides: the experience of death (Adorno Aesthe-
tic 120). According to Walter Benjamin, truth is not “a process of ex- “a process of ex-
posure which destroys the secret, but a revelation which does justice 
to it” (Origin 31). Like the alchemist—a key figure in Gamoneda’s 
work—the critic can see the text as a funerary pyre and pay atten-
tion not to the ashes, but to “the flame itself: the enigma of being 
alive” (Illuminations 4-5). Therefore, an important function of cri-
tics in their approach to Gamoneda’s singular testimony is to throw 
into relief the enigma of the past that the witness tries to keep alive 
in the present time. The critic becomes a unique kind of witness 
who offers his or her own account within the possibilities afforded 
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the possibility of showing themselves “intensely receptive” to the 
poem. Thus, the channel of testimony is kept “infinitely open”: the 
channel created by the “song of disappearance” allows the enigma 
of the past to live through the present towards the future. Indeed, 
the poet reminds readers of their own singular, enigmatic absence: 
“I will make a pact with your disappearance” (El 191). Through the 
specular play of deictics readers also come from “the Unknown,” as 
though we were reading a necessarily “incomprehensible” testimony 
to our own future death (“Discurso” n. pag.). This account of “what 
is left of us” is “incomprehensible” insofar as it bears witness to the 
impossibility of offering a full, truthful rendition of the past.
In  the  current  context  of  the  debate  over  the  relationship 
between memory and history, this sense of the adjective “incom-
prehensible” is important: the past is impossible to encompass. Like 
every testimonial account, Gamoneda’s poem is never fully closed, 
not only because the witness can still tell and retell his tale until the 
day he dies, but because for the poet the past itself changes. Ga-
moneda does not write about his childhood; he writes it. He does 
not represent his childhood; he presents it (Armario 5). The past is 
a form of writing and Gamoneda’s testimonial writing transforms 
the past as if the past were the present: his learning of old age is “la 
forma que adoptan ahora en mí el pasado y sus sombras” (Armario 
5) ‘the shape that the past and its shadows now take in me.’ If me-
mory is “always consciousness of loss,” and, thus, “consciousness of 
going towards death,” the poem is a reminder of death both in the 
past and in the future—a memento mori (Cuerpo 24). Gamoneda’s 
testimonial poetry continues to be enigmatic, secretive, and even 
cryptic in spite of critical interpretations—like the “remains” in Ce-
lan’s poetry, it offers itself only to “confirm that there is something 
secret there, withdrawn, forever beyond the reach of hermeneutic 
exhaustion” (Derrida Sovereignties 26). In Descripción de la mentira 
the poet decides to meet with what is offered to him in the “dis-
tribución de los residuos” (El 177) ‘distribution of residues.’ Critics 
should explain this “distribution,” while still respecting the “residue” 
for what it is: a part of an “incomprehensible” whole, remains of a 
destruction “beyond the reach of hermeneutic exhaustion,” as open 
and incomprehensible as the contradictory memory of death inscri-
bed in Gamoneda’s text: “Mi memoria es maldita y amarilla como Aguirre-Oteiza                               391
el residuo indestructible de la hiel” (El 182) ‘My memory is cursed 
and yellow like the indestructible residue of bile.’ Like Benjamin’s 
angel of history, the critic can gaze on the wreckage, “attempt to 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed,” but he 
or she will move towards the future without being able to make the 
growing “pile of debris” whole again (Illuminations 257-58). Critical 
approaches to Gamoneda’s work would do well, therefore, to respect 
the singularity and strangeness of its poetic testimony (Engdahl 8). 
They should be mindful of the contradictory experience of the sur-
vivor that gives testimony in spite of all, even while feeling haunted 
by the ghostly faces of the past until he himself becomes a specter 
touched by death. One of Gamoneda’s recent poems is a disturbing 
reminder of such an experience: “No quiero ser mi propio extraño, 
estoy entorpecido por las visiones. Es difícil ... trabajar en la retrac-
ción de rostros desconocidos hasta que se convierten en rostros 
amados y después llorar porque voy a abandonarlos o porque ellos 
van a abandonarme” (El 465) ‘I don’t want to be my own stranger. 
I’m hindered by visions. It is hard … to work on the withdrawal of 
unknown faces until they become loved faces and then to weep be-
cause I’m going to abandon them or because they are going to aban-
don me.’ The enigmatic faces that invoke the poet in Descripción de 
la mentira keep changing and coming back to haunt him. In spite 
of all, the poet does not reconcile himself: he keeps writing what is 
left of us, creating and re-creating the possibility of a testimony—a 
song of disappearance.
Notes
1 References to Gamoneda’s poetry, hereafter cited as El, are to Esta luz, his 
collected poetry. Translations of Descripción de la mentira and Lápidas ‘Grave-
stones’ are Donald Wellman’s. Some have been adjusted. All other translations 
are mine.
2 Boñar is located in the province of León. As we shall see, Boñar is both a trig-
ger to the act of writing the poem as well as an ambivalent mark of its textual 
closure. 
3 According to Gamoneda, Descripción de la mentira is both a biographical and 
a hermetic book (“En la vejez” n. pag.). Gamoneda also believes that poetic 392       ST&TCL, Volume 36, No. 2 (Summer 2012)
thought cannot falsify biographical reality (Armario 236).
4 Critic Susan Suleiman argues that the Holocaust has become a template for 
the investigation of collective memory in various parts of the world (2).
5 Judt frames recent Spanish history within the “Thirty Year War,” highlighting 
continuities in the conflicts between 1914 and 1945.
6 See Edad (Poesía 1947-1986), an edition of collected poetry published in 1987 
for which Gamoneda won the Spanish National Poetry Prize in 1988. 
7 Gamoneda unveiled this plaque outside his house in León where he has lived 
since 1934. Reticently enough, the poet believes that this plaque is the first tes-
timony in Spain of something that is related to his writing (“En Asturias” n. 
pag.). Gamoneda has also pointed out that Gravestones can be read as a foot-
note to Descripción de la mentira (“Una conversación” n. pag.). 
8 In 1994, Mayhew asserted that Descripción de la mentira gave the impression 
of a “highly detailed but ultimately undecipherable symbolic code” (83).
9 The discredit is the target of Juliá’s criticism. 
10 For Derrida, survival is an intrinsic part of testimony (“Demeure” 45).
11 These lines illustrate the triple deictic that structures testimony (Ricoeur 
163-64).
12 Gamoneda has explained the silence that preceded Descripción de la mentira 
with the question of whether there is anything more incongruous than to try 
to create “obras de arte con el miedo a la muerte” (Cuerpo 106) ‘works of art 
death while fearing it.’ 
13 I have adjusted the translation of Didi-Huberman’s text.
14 As Derrida argues, testimony is “poetic or it is not, from the moment it 
must invent its language and form itself in an incommensurable performative” 
(“Demeure” 83).
15 According to Gamoneda, words “retumba[ro]n en [su] cabeza” ‘resound[ed] 
in [his] head’ while he was walking in Boñar. This significant interior resound-
ing stirred his poetic thought (“Entrevista” n. pag.).
16 In LaCapra’s terms, Gamoneda’s poem departs from a redemptive notion 
of mourning insofar as it does not allow for the overcoming of melancholy 
(Writing 150-51). In this sense Loureiro’s statement is relevant: “I have never 
felt reconciled—nor do I need to—nor have I forgotten, nor will I ever forgive 
anyone for the thirty years of repression” (“Pathetic” 226).
17 The irreducible singularity of the verbal body introduces us into “the enigma 
of testimony, next to the irreplaceability of the singular witness” (Derrida Sov-Aguirre-Oteiza                               393
ereignties 67).
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